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Decade-old (1) and recent warnings for 
coronaviruses with zoonotic epidemic 
potential (2) could have prevented the 
emergence of coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) (3). We therefore agree with 
Watsa and colleagues (“Rigorous wildlife 
disease surveillance,” Perspective, 10 July, 
p. 145) that wildlife biosurveillance should 
increase. However, representing animals 
as a threat to humans through disease 
transmission leads to ill-conceived reac-
tive policies (4). A perspective (5) in which 
animals and humans share similar risks of 
pathogens and infections, making animals 
relevant disease models and sentinels, 
would be more effective. Clarifying the con-
nection between animal and human health 
could increase public support for research 
seeking to understand host-switching in 
animals, such as the study of virus evolution 
(6), interactions in pathogen communities 
(7), and pathogen discovery (8). 
A shared-risk perspective on emerg-
ing infectious diseases mirrors the field 
of EcoHealth, which explores the links 
between ecosystem, animal, and human 
health. Such strategies place value in 
healthy ecosystems through an integrative 
LETTERS
approach that considers both pathogen 
biodiversity and social-ecological drivers 
(9). Prevention based on understanding 
the transmission of pathogens through 
EcoHealth-based emerging infectious 
disease surveillance is a promising avenue 
for sustainability science, orders of magni-
tude cheaper than mitigation in response 
to a transfer to human hosts (10), and less 
intrusive than current crisis responses.
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biorepository capacity
In their Perspective “Rigorous wildlife 
disease surveillance” (10 July, p. 145), M. 
Watsa et al. underscore the value of One 
Health approaches to stimulate integration 
Disease transmission can occur at live animal markets, but zoonotic disease research could benefit from an emphasis on humans’ and animals’ shared risk of infection.
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across currently siloed efforts in zoo-
notic research and mitigation. To achieve 
comprehensive decentralized pathogen 
surveillance, there is an urgent need to 
develop environmental and biodiversity 
infrastructure in biodiverse countries 
experiencing high rates of habitat 
conversion, wildlife trafficking, and 
human-wildlife interactions. 
Approximately one-third of One 
Health networks lack an environmental 
component, fewer than half are active 
in wildlife surveillance, and almost 
none is led by developing countries (1). 
International support for development 
of natural history museums with frozen 
vertebrate tissue collections remains a 
key component missing from the One 
Health equation. Most pathogens causing 
severe outbreaks in humans are zoonotic 
in origin (2); thus, understanding their 
evolution and that of their wild animal 
hosts is imperative. 
As was the case for coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) (3), identifying wild 
animal reservoirs can be challenging 
when biorepositories are lacking (4). In 
most countries, natural history biore-
positories remain poorly supported and 
largely disconnected from public health 
initiatives. For example, most studies of 
bat coronaviruses to date (5), including 
the PREDICT animal surveys discussed 
in Watsa et al., did not preserve host 
specimens or tissues, thus limiting the 
potential for molecular host identification 
or replication and extension of the science 
(6). Emerging infectious disease response 
hinges on sampling depth across space, 
time, and taxonomy, the very sampling 
enabled by museum biorepositories. 
As primary biological infrastructure, 
in-country development of museum col-
lections that follow best practices (7), with 
specimen data freely available through 
the internet, should be an interna-
tional imperative (8) for effective global 
surveillance and mitigation of emerging 
infectious diseases. 
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We agree with Vanhove et al. that wildlife 
conservation and emerging infectious 
disease screening are two sides of the 
same coin. Wildlife and humans can 
be vulnerable to spillover events by the 
same pathogen. For example, respiratory 
diseases (1) and Ebola virus (2) outbreaks 
have occurred simultaneously in great 
apes and humans. Pathogens also affect 
biogeographical species range expan-
sions, contractions, and extinctions (3). 
Biosurveillance efforts should reflect that 
health risks are shared by humans and 
wildlife, a central tenet of the One Health 
framework (4). As Vanhove et al. point 
out, wildlife can serve as the source for 
preventive solutions that mitigate spill-
over risks into humans and animals. 
A shared risk perspective could also 
combat the narratives that portray animals 
as dangerous pests or disposable commodi-
ties that endanger human health (5), as 
in the case of bats (6), many of which are 
likely not hosts for coronaviruses such as 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (7). In addition to 
emphasizing shared risk, such misinforma-
tion can be countered with well-researched 
messaging following a zoonotic outbreak. 
Conservation social science has honed a 
suite of tools to identify the often unpre-
dictable human motivations behind (8), 
and the possible negative consequences of, 
such communications (9). 
Colella et al. suggest that surveillance 
efforts should include natural history col-
lections. Some natural history museums 
and zoos archive biobanked specimens, 
cryopreserved viable cell cultures, disease 
specimen banks, and histopathology 
samples, but this highly effective practice 
(10) is limited by high costs. We agree 
that devoting funding toward biodiver-
sity banking within countries at high 
risk for emerging infectious diseases 
would improve conservation outcomes. 
Taxonomically diverse biobanked tissues 
and live cell cultures could expand studies 
of host-pathogen relationships, clarify-
ing host range or affected tissues and 
providing in vitro systems for infectivity 
and pathogenicity investigations. Such 
collections could allow drug develop-
ment for humans to expand beyond just 
a few animal laboratory models, given 
that relatively well-studied viruses such 
as SARS-CoV-2 are potentially broadly 
infectious across taxonomic orders (11). 
Comparative genomics and transcrip-
tomics among nonmodel species are 
used infrequently in biomedical research 
programs but hold great potential for 
prioritizing species and gene targets with 
alternative host defense mechanisms for 
laboratory study (12). 
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